Challenges of security and trust of mobile devices as digital avionics component by Akram, Raja & Markantonakis, Konstantinos
CHALLENGES OF SECURITY AND TRUST OF MOBILE DEVICES AS
DIGITAL AVIONICS COMPONENT
Raja Naeem Akram, Konstantinos Markantonakis, Royal Holloway, University of London. Egham, UK
Abstract
Mobile devices are becoming part of modern
digital avionics. Mobile devices can be applied to
a range of scenarios, from Electronic Flight Bags
to maintenance platforms, in order to manage and
configure flight information, configure avionics net-
works or to perform maintenance tasks (including
offloading flight logs). It can be argued that recent
developments show an increased use of personal
mobile devices playing an integral part in the digital
avionics industry. In this paper, we look into different
proposals for integrating mobile devices with various
avionics networks – either as part of the Bring Your
Own Device (BYOD) or Corporate Owned Personally
Enabled (COPE) paradigms. Furthermore, we will
evaluate the security and trust challenges presented
by these devices in their respective domains. This
analysis will also include the issues related to the
communication between the mobile device and air-
craft network either via wired or wireless channels.
Finally, the paper puts forward a set of guidelines with
regards to the security and trust issues that might be
crucial when enabling mobile devices to be part of
aircraft networks.
Introduction
In the aviation industry, there is a growing pro-
liferation of mobile devices, including tablets, smart
phones and portable computers. These devices are
increasingly not only used by the passengers but also
aircraft crew like pilots and maintenance staff. For
example, a pilot can create a flight plan on his or
her personal tablet (Electronic Flight Bag) and then
upload it to the aircraft [1]. In this scenario, either
the aircraft manufacturer or airline provides the pilot
with the necessary software application to perform
this task [2].
In addition to mobile devices being used by
the on-board aircraft crew, it is also used off-board
where it connects with the aircraft. Such connection
might be for maintenance purposes – downloading or
uploading necessary data.
Any form of mobile devices, whether used by
on-board or off-board crew has to interface with the
aircraft. Either using a wired or a wireless interface.
These interface present their own unique set of secu-
rity and operational issues.
It is projected that such devices might bring
operational benefits to pilots, on-board crewmembers
and maintenance crew. At the same time, it is docu-
mented that use of such technologies might increase
automation bias, complacency, aircrew distraction
and potential software errors [3]. Beside the listed
concerns, these devices potentially create additional
security and reliability issues. Depending upon the
mobile device, there is a potential that a compromised
mobile device might give a malicious entity a route to
aircraft’s on-board computers — and depending upon
the function of these devices the malicious entity can
cause the damage.
Another complication is who owns the mobile
device, and this ownership might restrict of what
an aviation organisation (airline, or aircraft manu-
facturer) can enforce. It is challenging to enforce a
user to follow a particular policy on a device that
is basically belongs to them. This is a traditional
security problem of user’s or human limitation in
following a policy, and due to this users are usually
considered the weakest link in a security related
process or framework.
In the context of this paper, we define a mobile
device as an off-the-shelve portable computer device
that can be used by pilots, aircraft crew, or main-
tenance personal. These devices can display, store,
process and communicate related information – with
on-aircraft systems and off-aircraft systems alike,
either using a wired or wireless medium. Examples
of such devices include smart phones, tablets and
potentially laptop computers.
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Figure 1. Mobile Device Connectivity with Aircraft
Systems
Figure 1 illustrate mobile devices potentially
connected to aircraft systems either by a wired or
wireless connection, while some of the mobile devices
might also have either cellular or Wi-Fi capability to
connect to off-aircraft systems (i.e. airline network,
aircraft manufacturer networks etc.). It has to be
noted that in this paper we will solely focus on
mobile devices and not the “installed devices” such
as the Class 3 Electronic Flight Bags (EFB) defined
in Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory
120-76 [4].
In this paper, we discuss different operational
frameworks for incorporating mobile devices into on-
board digital avionics, how these mobile devices can
interface with the aircraft system(s), what security and
reliability issues each of these schemes might present
and finally how to resolve the security issues along
with what technologies might be used to safeguard
mobile devices.
Corporate Integration Mobile Device
Paradigms
To major paradigms to incorporate mobile de-
vices to either an organisational computer system or
integrating mobile devices with aircraft’s on-board
avionics systems are COPE and BYOD. In this sec-
tion, we will discuss COPE and BYOD, along with
wired and wireless interface these devices can use to
communicate with avionics systems. Table I provides
a comparison between different integration paradigms
that a corporate can deploy to bring in mobile devices.
A detailed overview is provided in the following
sections that explain the elements in the Table I.
Corporate Owned Personally Enabled (COPE)
In this paradigm, a corporate entity, for example,
an airline, aircraft manufacturer or any other avionics
related company acquires mobile devices and they
customise these devices to suite their security needs
[5]. After installing the management software and
any other applications necessary for employees to
perform their function, these devices are then given
to individual employees. By acquiring the devices
for employees, the corporation can make sure that
only a high standard and secure device connects to
their aircraft system. In addition to this, the devices
allow users (employees) to also use it as they desire
– by enabling them to download applications they
prefer. Furthermore, as the devices are owned by the
corporate entity, they can easily manage its enrolment
as a secure device to connect and communicate with
the aircraft systems.
Furthermore, the IT department of the corpo-
ration can keep a track of their mobile devices. If
required push updates and also prohibit applications
that are deemed dangerous to the secure functionality
of their applications and functions. In this paradigm,
corporate entity can exercise a stronger control over
the mobile devices. However, at the same time em-
ployees might not get the same level of usability as
they enjoy on their personal devices. Furthermore,
if the mobile device were acquired off-the-shelve
then the underlying platform and hardware would
still be out of their control. Any loopholes in the
underlying platform and hardware would require the
mobile device manufacturer to fix and update. A brief
explanation the Table I in the context of the COPE is
as below:
• Device Ownership: As discussed before, the
company acquires the devices and configure
them as they desire before issuing it to their
employees. The company has full control and in
turn full responsibility of security in this model.
• Application Control: As the device is full control
of company, they can install or delete any appli-
cation they desire. Furthermore, they can also
prohibit certain applications from be installed
on to their device by its respective users (i.e.
employee).
• Protecting Company Assets: As the IT depart-
ment of the company has full control over the
device, they can lock it down to have maximum
Criteria COPE BYOD CYOD
Device Ownership Company (IT Department) Employee (User) Company’s Approved/Preconfigured Devices
Application Control Full (IT Department) Full (User) Partial (IT Department and User)
Protecting Company Assets Full (IT Department) Partial (User) Partial (IT Department and User)
Responsibility of Securing the Device IT Department User Partial (IT Department and User)
User’s Privacy Issues Significant Limited Limited
Usability and Freedom of Use for Employees Limited Full Limited
Table I. Comparison between COPE, BOYD and CYOD
assurance that no breach of data could be carried
out on these device. Furthermore, the IT de-
partment might also be responsible for repairing
the device, which helps limit the potential break
carried out during the repair process by a third
party.
• Responsibility of Securing the Device: IT de-
partment of the company is fully responsible
for securing the device. After said that, user
education regarding best practices to security
might still be necessary to educate individual
employees.
• Privacy Issues: Employees have no privacy pro-
tection. Any activity carried over the company
device could potentially be captured by the IT
department – either for operational or security
reasons.
• Usability and Freedom of Use for Employees:
As users access to the device would be re-
stricted and she would not be able to install or
delete applications, the freedom of use would be
limited. However, usability would depend upon
how the company design their services for their
employees.
Keeping in mind that COPE model is closet to
the traditional and much preferred by organisations
model known as Corporate Owned Business Only
(COBO).
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)
In this paradigm, a user acquires a mobile device
for her. The user can then approach her employer
and request the company application/credentials to
connect her device to the aircraft system [6]. The
mobile device management system of the company
that can either be an airline, aircraft manufacturer or
maintenance contractors then enrol the given device
to the system. The company can then also issue their
application to the user and assign any associated
credentials. To some extend the employer can exercise
a limited control on the user’s device. However,
fundamentally the device belongs to the user and it is
challenging to control user’s activity on such devices.
Furthermore, the management of software up-
dates to patch discovered vulnerabilities and any
additional security software on such device might be
at user’s prerogative.
• Device Ownership: Users purchase the device
and they own it.
• Application Control: Employer only has the con-
trol of their own application. Whereas, user is
free to install or delete any applications they
required. The employer would not be able to
monitor what other applications are installed on
the device.
• Protecting Company Assets: Although, IT de-
partment of the employer is responsible for pro-
tecting the company’s digital assets but if some
sensitive data is stored on the device (as part of
the company’s application). It is challenging to
provide an assurance that such data might not
be breached – either by the user or a malicious
entity who gain access to the device.
• Responsibility of Securing the Device: The re-
sponsibility of updating the device in a timely
manner and potentially have tools to protect
against malicious intrusions falls under the
purview of individual users (employees). This
is a challenging prospect of the company to
ensure that their employees take due care of their
personal devices. User training and awareness of
security concerns would be critical in this model
but it has its limits.
• Privacy Issues: Employers can only monitor the
user activity that she carries out using their
applications or during access to their resources
(i.e. company internet and website). Any other
activities carried on the device are not monitored
thus provide a level of privacy to employees.
• Usability and Freedom of Use for Employees:
User has full access to the device and she can use
the device they way she deems right. As before,
usability deals with the easy with which she
can access her company’s resources – something
dependent upon company’s design.
Choose Your Own Device (CYOD)
Potentially a compromise between the COPE
and CYOD paradigm is referred as the CYOD. In
this model, a company defines a list of preselected
and pre-configured devices that are authorised to be
brought into the company’s network. Employees are
then give the choice to buy any one of such devices
and then use them to connect with the company’s
network [7]. As the company as preselected the device
and might have pre-configured it to their security re-
quirements, they might have more trust in the device.
It can also facilitate the company to exercise some
level of security management on the device, either
managing the patch updates and applications that can
be installed. However, all of this is dependent upon
the employee-employer relationship. A user might
decide agree on the company managing their own
application on her mobile device but not enforcing
her on what she can or cannot use the device for – as
in this model the final owner is still the user because
she has paid for the device.
• Device Ownership: Actual ownership of the de-
vice is with the employee as she is paid for it.
However, the respective employer might exercise
some privileges on such devices.
• Application Control: Employees can download
applications on to their devices but the employer
might have some security application installed
on the device that employees cannot delete.
Employee might be given free hand in installing
and deleting any application they want except the
ones that employer has installed.
• Protecting Company Assets: Employer has the
lead role in this but employee?s assistance is
necessary. Security updated and the employer
can push patches to their employee’s device.
Employees have to use the device in a secure
way that they might not become a route to breach
company’s data.
• Responsibility of Securing the Device: Respon-
sibility of this lies at both the employer and
employee.
• Privacy Issues: Limited privacy issues, more then
BYOD but less then COPE. Company might still
be able to capture the activities of the user but
restrict itself to certain activities related to the
security and reliability of their application.
• Usability and Freedom of Use for Employees:
User has limited freedom to user the device as
they desire as long as they do not try to infringe
any company policies. Usability has the same
level as discussed before in COPE and BYOD.
Interfacing with Aircraft Systems
The discussion of the interface is crucial as it
defined the level of control and access to the aircraft
systems can be designed. There are two interfacing
medium, wired or wireless. In a wired medium, a
mobile device connects with the aircraft system over a
wired link either using a docking stations or a physical
port connection. A physical access is required to such
connection points, which might restrict certain attack-
ers. Furthermore, as the communication medium is
wired, gaining access to the communication traffic is
challenging (if not impossible) that requires, again, a
physical access to the communication wires.
Whereas, if the interface is over the wireless
then a physically restricted adversary might be able
to either (try) to connect to the aircraft systems or at
least be able to listen to what is being communicated
over the wireless channel. The security requirement
of the wireless and wired interfaces is starkly different
from an adversary, which do not have either access to
the mobile device or physical access to the aircrafts.
However, for an adversary that compromises the
mobile devices the notion of the security in terms
of wired or wireless communication channel has not
implications. What this adversary is restricted to or
by is the on-device security mechanisms that might
prevent a malicious code/entity interfering with the
sensitive process/application related to the avionics
ecosystem.
The objective of the discussion on the interfacing
was the put the message across that for a holistic
approach to the security for the mobile devices for
avionics systems – interface restrictions is an impor-
tant issue with pros and cons for both wireless and
wired options. However, neither of them completely
isolates nor mitigates all potential security concerns.
Evaluation Case Studies
In the previous section, we discussed different
deployment models for the mobile device integration
with aircraft systems. In this section, we focus on
three case studies where deployment of mobile de-
vices might be relevant. In subsequent sections we
will analyse how different deployment models in the
context of these case studies influence the security of
mobile devices.
Mobile Device as Electronic Flight Bag
An Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) is a manage-
ment device that helps flight crew to perform flight
management related tasks in an easy and convenient
manner. According to the FAA Advisory Circular
120-76C, an EFB is an electronic display system
intended primarily for cockpit/flight deck and/or cabin
use [2]. In this paper we focus on Class 1 and Class
2 of EFB, as defined in the FAA Advisory [4].
A Class 1 and Class 2 EFB are off-the-shelves
mobile devices that have no FAA design, production,
or installation approval – as a whole device or its sub-
components. Devices in these two class can connect
to the aircraft system data and the only difference
between is whether the EFB is mountable or not [4].
Mobile Device as Maintenance Tool
Mobile devices that a maintenance crew has to
offload the flight logs, perform diagnostics and po-
tentially perform aircraft system configuration. Such
devices might be operated either by boarding the
aircraft or from ground while the aircraft is stationary
on the ground. For this device, they can either con-
nect directly with the aircraft subsystems like engine
management systems or required to be connected via
an aircraft central system or hub to communicate
with any of its subsystems. As noted above, these
devices might have the privilege to make changes
to the aircraft’s operating parameters/configurations.
Thus making them a crucial case of mobile devices
that connect with the aircraft systems.
Mobile Device as Operational Tool
These mobile devices are similar to the EFBs
discussed in the previous sections. However, instead
of these devices being operated in the cockpit or flight
deck. The cabin crew to manage the inflight entertain-
ment and ambience configuration uses these devices.
These mobile devices might potentially replace the
setting (configuration) console in the passenger cab-
ins that the crewmembers use to control the cabin
environment.
Threat Model
In previous section, we discussed three potential
deployments of mobile devices as part of the digital
avionics networks. These three deployment models
have their own security and reliability concerns,
which might be unique to each of their deployment
scenarios and application/data they deal with. How-
ever, in this section we discuss two generic types of
an adversary in the context of the mobile devices –
as defined in this paper. Keeping in mind that this
categorisation is made based on the level of access
each adversary has to the mobile device and not
on the basis of individual adversary’s capability to
compromise a given device.
On-Device Adversary
On-device adversaries are malicious users that
can potentially compromise the mobile device. By
doing so, depending upon the depth of compromise
they can control the execution of any sensitive ap-
plications that connects with the aircraft system and
communication relevant information. The closer an
adversary in compromise to the hardware of the
mobile device, the more powerful he or she is – with
abilities to interrupt or modify the execution of and/or
data communication from a sensitive application run-
ning on the device.
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Figure 2. On-Device Adversary Target Layers
For an on-device adversary, the aim is the com-
promise any of the layers (semantically) represented
in the Figure 2. The lower layers an adversary man-
ages to compromise, the stronger the potential to
influence an application and its data. The adversary
might have compromised the device either at the
manufacturing stage, by getting a physical access
even for a short while or remotely by installing a
malicious application on the device. Such adversary
might be physically away from the compromised
device but potentially still be able to control it.
Off-Device Adversary
Off-device adversaries are malicious users that
have no access to the mobile devices – either physical
or remote. These adversaries try to intercept the com-
munication between a mobile device and aircraft sys-
tem. Although, in the interface section we mentioned
that it is comparative easy to intercept a wireless
channel then a wired channel but for simplicity we
assume that off device adversary has equal access to
all communication medium between a mobile device
and aircraft system.
Unlike the on device adversary, the off device
adversary has to be near the geographic area of the
mobile device to effective intercept its communica-
tion. This adversary does not need to compromise
either the mobile device or the aircraft systems –
they only need to have the ability to intercept the
communication between the mobile device and the
aircraft system.
Evaluation of Mobile Devices as Digital
Avionics Component
In this section, we briefly evaluate the risk each
of the mobile device case study might face from
the two generic adversaries discussed in the previ-
ous section. In this section we are not evaluating
any particular products that actually deploys mobile
devices in the respective case studies but consider a
generic high-level analysis of what security risks these
deployment might face.
Mobile Device as Electronic Flight Bag
Mobile device as EFB might have strong access
control and firewalls on the aircraft system side,
which might prevent a non-authorised application
from connecting and communicating potentially in-
correct data. However, an on-device adversary can
potentially control the execution of the sensitive appli-
cation that is authorised to communicate with the air-
craft system. Any cryptographic mechanism deployed
for either authentication or encryption/signature on
the data communicated from the device to the aircraft
would potentially be vulnerable to the on-device ad-
versary. Therefore, any security mechanism designed
as part of the sensitive mobile application would not
be effective if the adversary has access to the runtime
environment or worse if have access to the hardware.
It should be noted that any mechanism built on the
aircraft side of this would have little to no effect
in preventing an on-board adversary from interfering
with the sensitive applications activity.
Off-device adversary, in theory, if have an access
to the communication between the mobile device and
aircraft systems they might be able to eavesdrop. An
active off-device adversary might even be able to
inject some data to this communications; however, if
data integrity is not assured in this communication.
This attack might work.
Mobile Device as Maintenance Tool
Similar to the EFBs, the mobile device as main-
tenance tool might have little defence against on-
board adversary if any or all countermeasures im-
plemented by the application developer are based on
the applications. For instance if the mobile device
adhere to BYOD; however, it should be noted that
other mechanism also do not fair well against an
advance adversary that has the ability to compro-
mise the mobile device. If the aircraft configuration
is generated on the mobile device and then using
secure cryptographic mechanism communicated to
the aircraft systems, then such an update would not
be secure against on-device adversary. However, if
the mobile device is just a communication conduit
between the back-office system and aircraft system
and all updates are secured end-to-end. In this case
on-device adversary would not be able to modify the
end-to-end communication channel.
Whereas, for the off-device adversary, if the
communication is unencrypted or there is a vulner-
ability in the communication scheme then he or she
might be able to potentially exploit it. However, as
off-device adversary does not have the capability
to break the standard cryptographic algorithms that
restricts it to what he or she can achieve.
Mobile Device as Operational Tool
Unlike the previous two cases, it can be argued
that mobile devices as operational tools might pose
the least amount of safety risk to the aircraft sys-
tems. As discussed in the previous sections, opera-
tional tool might deal with the in-flight entertainment
and/or cabin ambience. The maximum an attacker can
achieve would be modifying some parameters in such
systems – if such a provision were allowed in the
system. The on-device adversary, as by now realised
to be a most advanced adversary can manage to
interrupt the execution and potential can process any
command as desired. whereas the off-board adversary
can mount replay attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks
and/or denial of service attack. However, replay at-
tacks might pose the most significant danger as it
might trigger certain cabin condition, which might
perturb the cabin passengers.
Guidelines for a Secure and Trusted In-
tegration
In the previous sections we discussed two cat-
egories of adversary, their capabilities and their risk
potential for all three-use cases of mobile devices.
The question arise is “how real is the threat of
the on-board adversary?”. A valid question and the
potential of it being realised is not the realm of
fantasy. There are examples in which devices were
shipped with built-in Trojans [refs] and/or device
were compromised by advance adversary after being
issued to the users [ref] that have escalated privileges.
As the aircraft safety is paramount and its reliability
is stringently required, we consider that designing a
system that is secure to such adversaries could only be
the reasonable option. In this section, we list some of
the security considerations that should be taken into
account when deploying mobile devices to interface
and communicate with aircraft systems.
Least Privilege Architecture
Each user and mobile device that connects with
the aircraft system should be authenticated. The ac-
cess privilege issued to the user and mobile device
should be atomic. An atomic access is defined as
individual users and devices have their own set of
separate privileges – unique to each user and device.
Only those privileges will be given to a user that the
device is also permitted to have. Furthermore, each
access privilege should have a clear and pre-defined
time scale, after this time the user and device should
re-authenticate themselves to the aircraft systems.
Certain aircraft systems should only allow access
when certain environment conditions are met. For
example, maintenance crew might only be allowed to
access maintenance logs once the aircraft is grounded
and stationary. Furthermore, a reconfiguration of a
potential aircraft system is only allowed if the aircraft
is grounded and in maintenance phase.
Trusted and Isolated Enrolment
Mobile devices and users have to be enrolled to
relevant organisation’s privilege system to gain access
to aircraft systems. These organisations can be airline
operator, aircraft maintainers and manufacturer. In
any case, a mobile device and user enrolment should
be closely monitored. There should be a robust system
to vet users and potentially devices (if possible) at this
stage.
Strong Function Classification
Each application issued to a user and device
should have a restricted code base. Only the appli-
cation code that is necessary to perform the relevant
tasks should be there. Hiding functionality based on
the access privilege is potentially not a preferable
solution in this case.
Strong Binding with Aircraft and Operational-
Environment
Each device and user account should be associ-
ated with the individual aircraft. This is to avoid and
potential issue in which a user or device credentials
are used to access an aircraft system when the person
is no where near the aircraft or not working at the
time of access. The access credentials and privilege
to access an aircraft should be as unique as possible
and a restricted in time and geographical location as
possible. Furthermore, mobile devices (if possible)
should have a strong bidding to the aircraft systems.
Hardened Firewall Mechanism
A strong firewall mechanism with in-depth
packet inspection scheme should be taken into ac-
count for the mobile connectivity with the aircraft
systems. Furthermore, firewall should also be able
to detect any covert channels and enforce strong
information flow policies.
Strong Access Control Mechanism
Access control should be implemented on strong
authentication schemes. Both user and device should
be authenticated separately. User authentication is
based on stronger mechanisms like biometrics (widely
available on mobile devices now) and device au-
thentication should be based on two-way challenge-
response protocols.
Strong Secure and Trusted Channels
Any communication between a mobile device
and the aircraft system, whether over the wired or
wireless interface, should be protected using cryp-
tographic mechanisms. For this purpose, a secure
and trusted channel protocol should be deployed.
In a secure and trusted channel protocol, not only
the communicating entities authenticate to each other
but also their internal states are also validated to
be trustworthy. For validation of the software (and
potential hardware) state of the aircraft application
on the mobile device a trusted platform architecture
could be deployed – discussed in subsequent sections.
This will not only ensure that the communication
channel is protected and devices are authenticated but
also that the status of applications on the devices are
also secure (and free of any malicious alterations). For
an in-depth analysis and security recommendations
for how to design a secure channel for digital avionics
systems, please refer to [8].
Data Integrity, Traceability, and Validation
Any data loaded or off-loaded from an aircraft
should provide a strong integrity, traceability and
validation properties. A strong integrity mechanism
provides an assurance that data is not be modified
by any non-authorised entity during its storage and
transit. For integrity mechanism, cryptographic prim-
itives like hash functions and digital signatures can
be deployed. Data traceability provides a mechanism
in which data can be traced from its creation to
destruction. Such a mechanism is necessary for data
quality and forensics purposes. Data validation is a
mechanism in which certain element of data is created
in a way or certain errors are left in the data in a
manner that a trusted entity can verify the origin of
data. This mechanism can ascertain whether a data
presented to the aircraft or data from an aircraft to
airline/maintenance back office can be validated to
be generated by the entity to which it is attributed.
Trusted Platform
There are many proposals that push forward the
trusted platform architectures. In this section we will
discuss three of these:
Trusted Platform Module: The definition of
trust, taken from Merriam Webster’s online dictio-
nary1 states that trust is a “belief that someone or
something is reliable, good, honest, effective, etc."
The TPM specifications are maintained and de-
veloped by an international standards group called the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG)2 Today, TCG not
only publishes the TPM specifications but also the
Mobile Trusted Module (MTM), Trusted Multi-tenant
Infrastructure, and Trusted Network Connect (TNC).
With emerging technologies, service architectures,
and computing platforms, TCG is adapting to the
challenges presented by them.
The TPM chip, whose specification is defined
by the Trusted Computing Group TCG is known
as hardware root-of-trust into the trusted computing
ecosystem. Currently it is deployed to laptops, PCs,
and mobiles and is produced by manufacturers in-
cluding Infineon, Atmel and Broadcom. At present,
the TPM is available as a tamper-resistant security
chip that is physically bounded to the computer’s
motherboard and controlled by software running on
the system using well-defined commands. The TPM
MOBILE with Trusted Execution Environment has
recently emerged; its origin lies in the TPM v1.2 a
with some enhancements for mobile devices [9] . The
TPM provides:
1) The Roots of trust include hardware/software
components that are intrinsically trusted to es-
tablish a chain of trust that ensures only trusted
1Website: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trust
2Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the culmination of in-
dustrial efforts that included the Trusted Computing Platform
Association (TCPA), Microsoft’s Palladium, later called Next
Generation Computing Base (NGSCB), and Intel’s LaGrande. All
of them proposed how to ascertain trust in a device’s state in a
distributed environment. These efforts were combined in the TCG
specification that resulted in the proposal of TPM.
software and hardware can be used (see the
Mobile Trusted Module (MTM) section).
2) The Platform Configuration Register "PCR" in
the most modern TPM includes 24 registers.
It is used to store the state of system mea-
surements. These measurements are represented
normally by a cryptographic hash computed
from the hash values (SHA-1) of components
(applications) running on the platform. PCRs
cannot be written directly; a process called
extending the PCR can only store data.
3) The RSA keys: There are two types of RSA
keys that TPM generates and which are consid-
ered as root keys (they never leave the TPM):
a) Endorsement Key (EK): This key is used
in its role as a Root of Trust for Reporting.
During the installation of an owner in the
TPM, the manufacturer generates this key
with a public/private key pair built into
the hardware. The public component of
the EK is certified by an appropriate CA,
which assigns the EK to a particular TPM.
Thus, each individual TPM has a unique
platform EK. For the private component of
the EK, the TPM can sign assertions about
the trusted computer’s state. A remote
computer can verify that those assertions
have been signed by a trusted TPM.
b) Storage Root Key (SRK): This key is
used to protect other keys and data via
encryption.
c) Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs): The
AIK is used to identify the platform in
transactions such as platform authentica-
tion and platform attestation. Because of
the uniqueness of the EK, the AIK is used
in remote attestation by a particular appli-
cation. The private key is non-migratable
and protected by the TPM and the public
key is encrypted by a storage root key
(or other key) outside the TPM with the
possibility to be loaded into the TPM. The
security of the public key is bootstrapped
from the TPM’s EK. The AIK is generally
used for several roles: signing/reporting
user data; storage (encrypting data and
other keys); and binding (decrypting data,
used also for remote parties).
Trusted Execution Environment: A Trusted Exe-
cution Environment (TEE) provides necessary assur-
ance that during the execution of an application, no
on board application can interfere with its execution.
Two of the main proposals for the TEE are ARM
TrustZone and GlobalPlatofrom TEE – although in
recent years these two proposals are converging but in
this section we have briefly discussed them separately.
The ARM TrustZone also provides the architecture
for a trusted platform specifically for mobile devices.
The underlying concept is the provision of two virtual
processors with hardware-level segregation and access
control [10], [11]. This enables the ARM TrustZone
to define two execution environments described as
Secure world and Normal world. The Secure world
executes the security- and privacy-sensitive compo-
nents of applications and normal execution takes place
in the Normal world. The ARM processor manages
the switch between the two worlds. The ARM Trust-
Zone is implemented as a security extension to the
ARM processors (e.g. ARM1176JZ(F)-S, Cortes-A8,
and Cortex-A9 MPCore) [11], which a developer can
opt to utilise if required.
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Figure 3. Generic architectural view of ARM
TrustZone
The TEE is GlobalPlatform’s initiative [12]–[14]
for mobile phones, set-top boxes, utility meters, and
payphones. GlobalPlatform defines a specification for
interoperable secure hardware, which is based on
GlobalPlatform’s experience in the smart card in-
dustry. It does not define any particular hardware,
which can be based on either a typical secure element
or any of the previously discussed tamper-resistant
devices. The rationale for discussing the TEE as one
of the candidate devices is to provide a complete
picture. The underlying ownership of the TEE device
still predominantly resides with the issuing authority,
which is similar to GlobalPlatform’s specification for
the smart card industry [15].
Encrypted Execution: An application is executed
in a manner that all of the application instructions on
persistent and non-persistent storage are in encrypted
format [16]. The application is executed on processes
that decrypt the application n execution cycle before
the instruction is going to be executed – n has to
be as small as possible to provide efficient perfor-
mance. Such a solution considers that an adversary
has control over the software and hardware of a device
except for the internal circuitry of a processor, which
is considered to be trusted. This proposal realise on
the security and trust on the utmost basic element
of computing – a processor. If we consider that an
adversary has a compromised processor then it is
difficult to hide application execution from it.
Secure and Trusted Supply Chain for Mobile
Applications
Provisioning of the application to users mobile
device should be closed managed and monitored.
The applications that could have the capability to
be connected to an aircraft should only be available
for the mobile device on a restricted supply chain.
Meaning, such an application should not be accessible
on general-purpose application distribution channels.
Secure Decommissioning
At the end of the lifecycle of the mobile device
or presence of an application on such a device, the
application and device should be properly decommis-
sioned. Recycling should be carried out in a manner
that all security related parameters are completely
removed and the device itself is put on as black list
maintained by the airline or maintenance organisation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we looked into the provisioning
of connecting mobile devices in different operational
capacity with the aircraft systems. It can be argued
that mobile devices have the potential to provide
benefits; however, in this paper we looked into the
security implication of such an operational situation.
In this paper, we described three different mo-
bile device integration models – COPE, BYOD, and
CYOD. We have also provided a comparison between
these three models based on security control and
responsibilities. With these integration models an im-
portant aspect how a device can interface with an air-
craft, which is either via a wired or wireless interface.
In this paper, we have considered three deployed case
scenarios and potential threat model is presented. We
have divided an adversary into two categories – on-
board and off-board adversary. It is apparent that on-
board adversary has more capabilities to cause harm
then the off-board adversary, but this is by no way
means that when designing such an integration, we
can ignore the off-board adversary.
We have then briefly evaluated the case scenar-
ios based on the adversary’s capabilities. Based on
this analysis we have presented a minimum set of
guidelines to be followed when mobile devices are
considered to be integrated with an aircraft system.
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